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In the literature on the economics of international trade institutions, a key question is whether or 
not terms-of-trade effects drive international trade agreements. Recent empirical work addressing 
terms-of-trade effects has been restricted to non-WTO countries or accession countries, which 
differ markedly from existing WTO members and account for only a tiny fraction of world trade. 
This paper investigates whether MFN tariffs set by existing WTO members in the Uruguay 
round are consistent with the terms-of-trade hypothesis. We present a model of multilateral trade 
negotiations  featuring  free  riding  on  MFN  that  leads  the  resulting  tariff  schedule  to  display 
terms-of-trade  effects.  Specifically,  the  model  predicts  that  the  level  of  the  importer’s  tariff 
resulting from negotiations should be negatively related to the product of exporter concentration, 
as  measured  by  a  Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  (sum  of  squared  export  shares),  and  the 
importer’s market power, as measured by the inverse elasticity of export supply, on a product-
by-product basis. We test this hypothesis using data on tariffs, trade and production across more 
than 30 WTO countries and find strong support. We estimate that the internalization of terms of 
trade effects through WTO negotiations has lowered the average tariff of these countries by 
about 20% compared to its non-cooperative level. 
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1. Introduction 
International  agreements  between  countries  are  often  established  for  the  purpose  of 
discouraging beggar-thy-neighbor policies. A growing body of literature, led by Bagwell and 
Staiger (2002), argues that international trade agreements, like the WTO, can be understood in 
these terms. Specifically, governments acting unilaterally will tend to overuse tariffs and other 
trade restrictions, to the extent that these policies shift the cost of protecting a domestic industry 
onto foreign producers by altering the terms of trade. Conversely, WTO rules cause countries to 
internalize the terms-of-trade effects of their policies and thus lead to efficient policy choices. As 
compelling as this theory is, its empirical verification is hampered by its own logic, for if the 
WTO actually does this, then we should observe no relationship between a WTO member’s tariff 
schedule and its ability to affect the terms of trade (i.e., its market power); however, this would 
also be true of any alternative theory in which the terms of trade plays no role. Recent papers 
have sought to surmount this problem by focusing on special cases: Broda, Limao and Weinstein 
(2008) examine the tariff schedules of non-WTO countries; Bagwell and Staiger (2009) consider 
changes in the tariff schedules of recent accession countries; and Bown (2004) studies WTO 
disputes. All produce findings consistent with the terms-of-trade theory. As yet, however, the 
theory has not been empirically tested on the tariff schedules of existing WTO members, which 
cover the vast majority of world trade. 
This  paper  investigates  whether  MFN  tariffs  set  by  existing  WTO  members  in  the 
Uruguay round are consistent with the terms-of-trade hypothesis. To do this, we exploit what is 
arguably a flaw in the WTO, which is that multilateral trade negotiations over MFN tariffs are 
susceptible to free riding. Intuitively, if not all countries participate in the negotiations over an 
MFN tariff, then the negotiators may not fully internalize the terms-of-trade effects of reducing   3 
that tariff, and thus the negotiated tariff may continue to bear the imprint of market power. The 
trick  is  to  reliably  predict  which  countries  and  which  products  are  most  susceptible  to  this 
problem. For this we draw on the model of MFN free riding due to Ludema and Mayda (2009), 
which predicts that only the largest exporters of each product will participate in negotiations with 
a given importer
1 and therefore the level of the importer’s tariff resulting from negotiations 
should be negatively related to exporter concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (sum of squared export shares) on a product-by-product basis. Moreover, because it is 
driven by the terms of trade, this negative relationship should be proportional to the importer’s 
market power, as measured by the inverse elasticity of export supply. Thus, the model predicts 
that the MFN tariff rate is an inverse function of exporter concentration multiplied by importer 
market power. We test this hypothesis using data on tariffs, trade and production across more 
than 30 WTO countries and find strong support. We estimate that the internalization of terms of 
trade effects through WTO negotiations has lowered the average tariff of these countries by 
about 20% compared to its non-cooperative level. 
To conduct the empirical analysis, we construct two data sets on MFN applied tariffs and 
multilateral and bilateral trade flows. The first data set is disaggregated to the 6-digit HS level 
and uses data from COMTRADE and UNCTAD’s TRAINS. The second data set also includes 
information on production levels by sector but is more aggregated as it follows the 4-digit ISIC 
classification. In particular, the second data set is based on the World Bank Trade and Production 
database (WBTPD) (Nicita and Olarreaga 2001), which contains the necessary data for a small 
sample of mostly low and middle-income countries. We expand and update the WBTPD adding 
data for several high and middle-income countries.  
                                                 
1 This prediction accords with the WTO negotiating convention known as the “principal supplier rule,” as well as 
with anecdotal evidence on free riding found in earlier work, such as Finger (1979).    4 
In both datasets, we consider various measures of an importer’s market power over a 
given product. One is simply country size as measured by GDP. Another is a measure of the 
inverse elasticity of export supply that varies by importer and product, based on direct estimates 
from Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006). A third is the product’s degree of differentiation, 
according to the Rauch index (Rauch, 1999). This measure is motivated by the fact, also found in 
Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008), that product differentiation is significant in explaining the 
inverse elasticity of export supply (the true measure of market power). 
Our findings confirm that not only do the MFN tariffs of WTO countries depend on 
market  power  but  this  dependence  diminishes  as  tariff  negotiations  internalize  a  greater 
proportion of the terms-of-trade externality.  In our view, this is the clearest evidence to date in 
favor of the hypothesis that trade agreements are intended to neutralize the terms-of-trade motive 
for trade policy. 
In addition to making a clear contribution to the literature on the economics of trade 
agreements generally, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on MFN per se. The MFN 
free rider hypothesis is an old idea that rests on the observation that, because MFN commits a 
country to treat all of its trade agreement partners equally, the trade concessions it exchanges 
with any one partner must automatically be extended to all the others, who thereby get a free 
ride. Thus, MFN could create a free rider problem, wherein countries “deliberately refrain from 
making concessions … in order [to] avoid the obligation of extending such concessions to other 
countries” (Viner, 1924, p. 105). Today, the MFN clause is one of the pillars of the GATT/WTO 
system – any trade policy measure that a WTO country applies to the products of another WTO 
country must be applied equally to the same products of all WTO countries.
2   
                                                 
2 An exception is made for preferential trade agreements, such as free trade areas or customs unions under GATT 
Article XXIV.   5 
Previous literature has been divided about the importance of the MFN free rider problem. 
While formal models of the problem exist (e.g., Caplin and Krishna, 1988), recent theoretical 
literature casts doubt on its relevance to the GATT/WTO system (e.g., Ludema, 1991, Bagwell 
and Staiger, 2002). On the empirical side, early work by Finger (1979) and Lavergne (1983) find 
evidence suggestive of an MFN free rider problem in US tariffs.  This is confirmed by Ludema 
and Mayda (2009), which finds evidence of a significant free-rider effect of the MFN clause for 
US tariffs following both the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds. On the other hand, Bagwell and 
Staiger (2009) find no evidence of MFN free riding in the tariffs of countries recently acceding 
to the WTO.  
A notable limitation of these previous empirical studies is that they do not make use of 
market power information in estimating the MFN free rider effect. For a country like the US, 
with market power in a broad array of products, this may be a minor problem; however, when 
considering a broad spectrum of countries, some of which are small and developing, attention to 
the variation in inverse export elasticities is likely to be crucial. The novelty of this paper is in 
exploiting the relationship between terms-of-trade effects and MFN free riding to make possible 
the empirical estimation of both effects across a broad spectrum of countries. Our empirical 
findings confirm that indeed the MFN free rider problem is widespread and closely connected to 
terms-of-trade effects. The empirical specifications we test are closely related to the theoretical 
model and take into account institutional details, such as the timing of negotiations. In addition, 
we check the robustness of our results by using data at different levels of disaggregation, by 
controlling  for  additional  variables  (outside  of  the  theoretical  model)  and  by  addressing 
endogeneity issues with an instrumental variable estimation strategy.     6 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a sketch of the theory. 
Section 3 describes the cross-country data sets used. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy 
and main results of the analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theory 
In this section, we present a simple, stylized model of the MFN free rider problem to 
motivate our empirical analysis. The model is based on the "competing exporters" framework, 
originally developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1998) and used extensively in the literature on 
MFN (e.g., Saggi, 2009). There are C > 2 countries, a single numeraire good, and a large set Γ of 
non-numeraire goods. Each non-numeraire good 
€ 
g ∈ Γ is imported by a single country, and 
exported by the other countries. These goods are produced with sector-specific capital and a 
common factor, labor, under conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The 
numeraire is produced with labor alone. Each country has a representative consumer with a 
quasi-linear utility function.  
All countries are assumed to be members of the WTO and therefore entitled to either 
MFN or FTA treatment.  In particular, suppose a subset of the exporters of a particular good g 
are  members  of  a  free-trade  agreement  with  the  importer  of  g,  country  c,  and  thus  face  no 
impediments to trade on that good, while the rest are subject to country c’s MFN tariff.  Let τcg 
denote one plus the MFN ad valorem tariff rate of the importer. Let  cg denote the share of 
country c's total imports of g from FTA partners. Let the non-FTA exporters be indexed by i = 1, 
2, … , Ng , and let 
€ 
θig denote the exports of country i of good g as a share of country c’s total 
non-FTA imports.  For simplicity, assume these export shares are independent of τcg.
3 
                                                 
3 This would be true, for example, if all non-FTA exporters share a common elasticity of export supply.    7 
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The first term in (1) is the sum of consumer surplus over all goods, which is a function of 
domestic  prices 
€ 
pcg.  The  second  term  is  the  weighted  sum  of  producer  surplus  of  import-
competing sectors, where Γc denotes the set of all goods imported by country c. The extra weight 
€ 
λcg represents the political clout of import-competing sector g in country c. We do not model the 
exact political mechanism behind this weight, though it is consistent with a variety of political 
economy models (Baldwin, 1987). The third term is the sum of producer surplus of country c's 
export sectors, which is a function of world prices 
€ 
pg
∗. For simplicity, we assume export sectors 
receive no extra weight.
4 The fourth term is tariff revenue, which is non-negative for all import 
sectors, as we consider only non-negative import tariffs. The final term measures country c's 
concern about the interests of its FTA partners on products it imports. We have in mind that FTA 
partners may apply diplomatic pressure on the importing country to preserve their preferential 
market access. While we prefer not to digress into a complete model of this FTA interaction, we 
believe  it  is  potentially  important  enough  (see,  for  example,  Limão,  2007)  to  warrant  the 
inclusion of an exogenous parameter φcg to capture this effect. 
A key aspect of the MFN free rider problem is that countries are free to decide whether to 
participate or not in negotiations for the reduction of MFN tariffs. In keeping with item-by-item, 
request-and-offer method that has been GATT’s most common form of negotiation over the 
                                                 
4 That trade regimes are biased toward import-competing sectors is well known (Rodrik, 1995). We should point out, 
however, that our theoretical model can easily accommodate politically influential exporters. The main reason we 
leave this aspect aside is practical: no data is available to measure exporter political influence. Thus, in this short 
sketch of our model, we focus only on the components for which we have data.    8 
years, we allow these participation decisions to be made on a good-by-good basis.
5 We assume 
that if the importer decides not to participate in negotiations over a particular good, the tariff on 
that good remains at its original level, which we fix at the non-cooperative optimal tariff.  If an 
exporter decides not to participate, this exporter cannot be made to "pay" for any tariff reductions 
that occur in that good. To capture this, we assume that the exporters have access to transfers by 
which to compensate the importer for its tariff reduction, but non-participants make no such 
transfers, directly or indirectly.  In equilibrium, it may be that the transfers given and received by 
a country balance out across all goods, but we do not impose this constraint.
6 
As each negotiation is effectively separate from every other by assumption, we can drop 
the subscripts c and g and consider the negotiations over a generic good. Suppose the participants 
in  these  negotiations  consist  of  the  importer  and  a  set    of  non-FTA  exporters.  The 
membership of A is endogenous, but for now take it as given. We assume the outcome of this 
negotiation is an MFN tariff that is Pareto efficient for the participants. In this setting, Pareto 
efficiency for participants is equivalent to maximizing the sum of the payoffs of the importer and 
the members of A.  Using (1), it can be shown that the tariff that maximizes this sum (the 
“negotiated tariff”) satisfies, 
                                                 
5 In the Uruguay round, many countries, including the US, used the item-by-item approach, while others, most 
notably the EU, used a formula approach, whereby each country cuts tariffs across-the-board according to a certain 
formula agreed to at the outset. In fact, however, countries deviated considerably from the formula cuts on an item-
by-item basis, and many countries ignored the formula entirely (Hoda, 2001, pp. 30-32). Negotiations over these 
deviations took place on an item-by-item basis between principal suppliers. According to Hoda (2001, p. 47), “Thus 
a linear or formula approach did not obviate the need for bilateral negotiations: they only gave the participants an 
additional tool to employ in the bargaining process.” 
6 A constraint of this type could be interpreted as a form of reciprocity, though it is not exactly the same as the 
reciprocity emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger (2002). Imposing such a constraint would introduce linkages across 
the various negotiations that would make our model far more complex. While this would be an interesting direction 
for  future  research,  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  section,  which  is  intended  to  provide  a  tractable  model  for 
estimation.  We do attempt to control for reciprocity considerations in our empirical work but only in reduced form.    9 
    (2) 
where M denotes total imports and X domestic production of the importing country,   and   are 
the elasticities of demand for, and supply of, exports from non-FTA countries, respectively,
7 and 
 is the cumulative export share of participants (as a share of non-FTA imports). 
Equation  (2)  reflects  three  different  channels  affecting  the  negotiated  tariff.  The 
numerator captures the MFN free rider effect: the larger the market share of non-participants 
, the higher is the tariff. This is because, when participants negotiate a tariff reduction, 
non-participants gain improved market access to the importing country without paying for it – 
they are free riders. The negotiated tariff level reflects the fact that only a fraction   of a tariff 
reduction’s total benefit to non-FTA exporters is internalized by participants.  Moreover, the 
total benefit to non-FTA exporters depends on how much the tariff affects their terms of trade, as 
measured by  , the importing country’s inverse elasticity of export supply from non-FTA 
sources. Thus, the MFN free rider effect is proportional to the terms-of-trade effect of the tariff.  
In the extreme case of no participants ( ), the numerator of (2) is just the standard optimal 
tariff  formula.  If  all  countries  participate  ( ),  then  the  terms-of-trade  effect  is  fully 
internalized by participants and the numerator becomes unity.  This would imply free trade but 
for some terms in the denominator. 
The two terms in the denominator of (2) reflect the power of domestic producers and 
FTA partners, respectively.  The domestic political pressure term is familiar from the literature. 
Helpman (1997) shows that the equilibrium tariff is proportional to  , the inverse import-
                                                 
7  The  elasticity  of  demand  for  non-FTA  exports  can  be  decomposed  as  ,  where  µ  is  the  importing 
country’s elasticity of total import demand, and ξF is the elasticity of export supply from FTA members.     10 
penetration ratio, in a wide variety of political economy models. For example, in the model of 
Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994,  1995),  ,  where    is  an  indicator  of 
whether  or  not  the  sector  is  organized  into  a  lobby,    is  the  fraction  of  the  electorate 
represented by a lobby, and a measures the government’s concern for welfare relative to lobby 
contributions.  Empirical  work  by  Goldberg  and  Maggi  (1999)  and  Gawande  and 
Bandyopodhayay (2000) have estimated this model and confirmed that the sign of the effect of 
 on NTBs varies by sector, depending on the sectors’ political organization. According to 
our model, we would expect the same to be true of tariffs.  The FTA term takes into account that 
tariff reductions by the importing country erode the preferential access enjoyed by FTA partners. 
If the importing country does not fully internalize this negative externality on its FTA partners 
( ),  it  will  cut  tariffs  more  the  larger  is  the  FTA  share  of  total  trade.    Alternatively,  if 
maintaining the preference margin is a high priority, it could be that  , in which case the 
tariff would increase with FTA share.
8  
The goal of the empirical analysis is to properly measure the numerator of equation (2), 
the MFN free rider term, and estimate its effect on MFN tariffs, controlling for domestic political 
pressure and FTA effects as represented by the denominator of equation (2). The main obstacle is 
that we do not directly observe the set of participants involved in negotiating any given tariff; 
therefore we cannot construct the variable  . For this reason, we need a theory of participation. 
Developing such a theory allows us to investigate the root cause of the MFN free rider problem 
in addition to its effects on tariffs.  
                                                 
8 Limão (2007) provides a model in which the importer uses the preference margin as a means to induce its FTA 
partner to provide a regional public good.  His model effectively delivers φ > 1.  He finds tariffs increase with 
preferential trade share in the US, whereas Estevadeordal et. al. (2008) find the opposite for Latin America.    11 
To this end, assume that participation is voluntary and that countries play the following 
two-stage game: in the first stage, all countries decide to participate or not in the negotiations; in 
the  second  stage,  participants  negotiate  a  tariff  according  to  equation  (2).  Suppose  A  is  an 
equilibrium  set  of  participating  exporters.  Each  member    knows  that  by  refusing  to 
participate it will increase the resulting negotiated tariff from   to  . On the other 
hand, if the importer refuses to participate the tariff increases from   to  . Thus, 







∑ −[wc(τ )− wc(τ
n(A))]  (3) 
It follows that there exists an allocation of the surplus between the importer and members of A 
that supports A as an equilibrium set of participants, if and only if,  . 






∑ A)−[wc(τ )− wc(τ
n(A))]  (3')  
where 
€ 
ω(A) ≡ −(Σi∈N ′  w  i)
2 / ′  ′  w  c + Σi∈A ′  ′  w  i [ ] > 0. This approximation is accurate if the export shares 
are small. Note that the available surplus depends on the sum of the squared export shares of the 
participants. This is because the impact of an exporting country’s participation decision on the 
negotiated tariff is proportional to its export share (from equation (2)). Moreover, the amount an 
exporting country gains from a tariff change is also proportional to its export share. Thus, a 
participant’s  contribution  to  the  surplus  (which  is  the  difference  between  what  it  gets  by 
participating and not participating) depends on the product of the two effects, both proportional 
to the export share. Summing these over all participants gives the sum of squared export shares.   
  At this point, we can state our first main conclusion, which is that full participation 
( ) is possible if and only if the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of non-FTA export shares,   12 
, is sufficiently high. While we shall not prove this result here,
9 the necessary part can 
be  seen  immediately  from  (3')  evaluated  at  A  =  N.  Full  participation  requires  that 
€ 
0 ≤ Ω(N) ≈ Hω(N)− wc(τ )+ wc(τ
n(N)).  If  H  is  too  low,    will  be  negative  and  full 
participation cannot be sustained. Intuitively, a high H means that the cumulative surplus from 
participation for all exporters is sufficient to compensate the importer for choosing tariff  , 
which is the Pareto efficient tariff for the world as a whole. 
Although the condition   narrows the set of possible equilibria considerably, it 
does not generally produce a unique outcome. What is needed is a rule, or bargaining protocol, to 
determine how the surplus is divided among any given set of participants. Suppose the WTO (the 
collection of all countries, participants and free riders alike) has as its objective to maximize the 
total payoff of its members, while respecting the right of each member to voluntarily participate 
(or not) in negotiations and allowing those who do participate to negotiate the tariff that is Pareto 
efficient for them. This calls for a rule that selects from the sets satisfying   those with 
the minimum  .  
Ludema and Mayda (2009) show that two conclusions follow from this assumption. First, 
in  the  search  for  optimal sets  of  participants, we  can  restrict attention to  sets  satisfying  the 
Principal Supplier Rule (PSR), with minimal loss of generality. The PSR simply says that the set 
of participants should include all exporters above a certain size, as measured by export share. 
Second,  under  PSR  and  less-than-full  participation,  if  the  distribution  of  export  shares  is 
geometric, then any increase in   increases the cumulative market share of the optimal set of 
participants and thereby decreases the equilibrium tariff.
10  In other words, higher   should be 
                                                 
9 All proofs can be found in Ludema and Mayda (2009). 
10 Actually, this conclusion holds for any class of distributions that can be ranked according to first-order stochastic 
dominance.    13 
associated with higher   and therefore with a lower tariff.  In addition, from equation (2) we 
see that this effect is modulated by  , the importer’s monopoly power in trade. This is the 
main empirical prediction of the model. 
 
3. Cross-country data 
To carry out the cross-country empirical analysis, we need information for a multitude of 
importing  countries  on  MFN  tariffs,  trade  and  production  levels,  and  import  and  export 
elasticities.  Obtaining  internationally  comparable  data  for  all  these  variables  according  to  a 
common classification and level of aggregation is almost impossible. Thus, we have chosen to 
construct two complementary datasets, which differ in the number of variables available, level of 
aggregation and country coverage. The results turn out to be the same using both datasets. 
The first dataset contains applied MFN tariff rates, multilateral and bilateral trade flows 
for  36  countries
11,  comprising  a  wide  range  of  income  levels,  according  to  the  6-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) classification. The data set covers the period from 1993 to 2000.  This 
period of time includes the final years of the Uruguay round – which took place in 1986-1994 – 
and its implementation period. We constructed the data set by combining information collected 
from COMTRADE and UNCTAD's TRAINS. Data on the individual members of the European 
Union were combined, so as to create, in effect, a single country called the EU. This is because 
the EU maintains a common external tariff and negotiates as a bloc.
12 
                                                 
11The countries are (the date of entry into GATT/WTO is in parentheses): Argentina (1967), Australia (1948), Belize 
(1983), Bolivia (1990), Brazil (1948), Canada (1948), Chile (1949), Colombia (1981), Dominica (1993), Ecuador 
(1996), European Union (varies by country), Gabon (1963), Grenada (1994), Guatemala (1991), Hungary (1973), 
Iceland (1968), India (1948), Indonesia (1950), Japan (1955), Korea (1967), Madagascar (1963), Malaysia (1957), 
Mauritius (1970), Mexico (1986), Morocco (1987), New Zealand (1948), Nicaragua (1950), Norway (1948), Peru 
(1951), Romania (1971), Saint Kitts & Nevis (1994), Saint Vincent & the Grenadines (1993), Sri Lanka (1948,) 
Thailand (1982), Tunisia (1990), United States (1948). 
12 The European-Union (EU) includes the following countries (date of entry into the EU in parentheses): Belgium 
(1958), Luxembourg (1958), Netherlands (1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), Italy (1958), Denmark (1973),   14 
The main advantage of the 6-digit HS dataset is its very fine level of disaggregation 
(more than one thousand sectors per country with upwards of four thousand sectors for several of 
them)  and  the  extensive  country  coverage.  The  main  disadvantage  is  that  this  dataset  lacks 
production data, which prevents the construction of import penetration, an important factor in 
controlling for domestic political economy determinants of protection. To address this problem 
we construct a second dataset, which includes 31 countries. Twenty countries overlap with the 6-
digit HS dataset, including nearly all of the developed countries. This second dataset contains 
information on applied MFN tariff rates, multilateral and bilateral trade flows, and production for 
81 (or fewer) manufacturing industries at the 4-digit level of the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC Rev. 2). The data set covers the period from 1993 to 1999. All bilateral and 
multilateral import and export data are from the World Bank's Trade and Production Database 
(WBTPD) (Nicita and Olarreaga 2001).  The WBTPD is also the source of data on domestic 
production and applied MFN tariff rates for 18 countries in the sample, mostly middle and low-
income countries.
1314 We have augmented this initial dataset with data for 13 additional countries 
by collecting production and tariff data from the UNIDO INDSTAT4 (2006) Industrial Statistics 
Database and UNCTAD’s TRAINS, respectively.
15 Drawing data from these additional sources 
                                                                                                                                                            
Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986), Austria 
(1995), Finland (1995), and Sweden (1995); Turkey joined the customs union in 1996. To construct the EU data, we 
averaged the EC tariffs reported by TRAINS and summed together the production and trade data across members 
(netting out intra-EU trade flows). To obtain representative EU-wide elasticity estimates, we used the average of 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK.  
13 The WBTPD derives from several sources: UNCTAD Trains, UN Comtrade, and UNIDO Industrial Statistics are 
the sources of MFN tariffs, trade flows and production data, respectively. 
14 The 18 countries covered by the World Bank data set are (date of entry into GATT/WTO is in parenthesis): 
Bolivia (1990), Canada (1948), Chile (1949), Colombia (1981), Costa Rica (1990), Ecuador (1996), Egypt (1970), 
Guatemala  (1991),  Honduras  (1994),  Indonesia  (1950),  India  (1948),  Korea  (1967),  Mexico  (1986),  Malaysia 
(1957), Philippines (1979), Turkey (1951), United States (1948), and Venezuela (1990). 
15  Production  and  tariff  data  from  these  sources  is  used  for  the  following  13  countries  (date  of  entry  into 
GATT/WTO is in parenthesis): Australia (1948), Bangladesh (1972), European Union (varies by country), Japan 
(1955),  Morocco  (1987),  New  Zealand  (1948),  Norway  (1948),  Pakistan  (1948),  Panama  (1997),  Peru  (1951), 
Romania (1971), South Africa (1948) and Thailand (1982).    15 
is particularly important because it allows us to expand the analysis to include a greater number 
of high-income, high-trade countries, including the EU.  
 To construct MFN tariff rates at the 4-digit ISIC level, the WBTPD uses the simple 
average of the tariff lines within each product category. The benefit of simple averages, instead 
of trade-weighted averages (revenue divided by dutiable imports), is that they are invariant to 
changes in trade flows. The drawback is that a few highly protected tariff lines within a sector 
can seriously affect the average. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we restrict our ISIC sample to 
tariff averages less than 50% ad valorem.
16  
The 6-digit HS and 4-digit ISIC datasets are augmented with information from secondary 
sources.  Information  on  GATT/WTO  membership  is  drawn  from  Rose  (2004).  Estimates  of 
export supply and import demand elasticities are derived from Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein 
(2006) and kindly provided by David Weinstein. These vary by country and product (but not 
time) at the 3-digit HS level. Information about the degree of product differentiation is from 
Rauch (1999) and varies by product, according to the 4-digit SITC classification. The Rauch 
product classification divides goods into those that are sold on organized exchanges, those for 
which reference prices can be found in trade journals, and others. Products in the third category 
are interpreted as differentiated products. We use concordances to map the elasticity estimates 
and the Rauch classification to the 6-digit HS and 4-digit ISIC classifications.
17  
                                                 
16 This amounts to less than 5% of our observations. Our main results are not sensitive to this threshold, though 
overall fit diminishes if outliers are not excluded. Note that, as the 6-digit HS level is the tariff-line level for almost 
all WTO countries, we do not censor tariffs in the 6-digit HS dataset. 
17 Since 4-digit ISIC is more aggregated than 3-digit HS and 4-digit SITC, concording the data to ISIC required 
some care. To concord the elasticities, we took the median of the 3-digit HS values within each 4-digit ISIC. We 
used the median, rather than the mean, to diminish the effect of outliers, as the elasticity estimates had large standard 
errors. For the Rauch classification, we created a continuous measure (diffshare) equal to the share of the 4-digit 
SITC codes within each 4-digit ISIC category that were classified as differentiated according to Rauch's liberal 
definition.    16 
Our datasets have three dimensions: importing country, product and time. The period of 
time they cover allows us to pay attention to the timing of the negotiation and implementation of 
tariff agreements. This is important in the empirical analysis given that one might expect tariffs 
observed during the implementation period to be affected more by conditions prevailing during 
the negotiation period than by contemporaneous conditions. Thus, our dependent variable will be 
the applied MFN tariff rate averaged over 1995-2000 (or 1995-1999), while the independent 
variables are drawn from 1993, which was the final and most critical year of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  With  the  time  dimension  collapsed  in  this  way,  our  estimation  exploits  cross-
commodity and cross-country variation. 
Note that we use applied MFN tariff rates, averaged over several years, as opposed to 
bound rates.
18 In practice, the difference between the two tariff rates in many countries like the 
US is quite small, though the gaps can be large for developing countries. Our choice to use 
applied as opposed to bound rates is based on two sets of considerations. First, an important 
institutional  feature  is  that  applied  tariffs  are  not  immediately  subject  to  the  bound  rates 
negotiated  in  a  Round  but  are  phased-in  in  stages,  with  more  politically  sensitive  products 
phased-in as late as possible. This feature would be lost if we used only final bound rates. 
Second, while our theoretical model makes no distinction between bound and applied rates, 
Bagwell and Staiger (2005) provide a theory that accounts for the difference, based on private 
information  about  political  pressure.  In  their  model,  the  bound  rate  is  chosen  to  ensure  the 
incentive compatibility of applied rates, whereas applied rates fluctuate but on average maximize 
the expected welfare of the negotiating parties. Accordingly, the average applied rate is the more 
appropriate measure of our efficient tariff. 
                                                 
18 In GATT/WTO negotiations, countries negotiate tariff bindings, i.e. they do not explicitly agree to tariff levels but 
instead to tariff ceilings (bound rates) that tariff levels must not exceed.   17 
Summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
A. Empirical Strategy 
In the empirical analysis, we use a specification that is closely related to the theoretical 
model but also takes into account institutional details, such as the timing of negotiations. To 
make the link from our model, which assumes importer-specific goods, to the data, which are 
organized by product categories common to all countries, we partition the set of goods Γ into K 
"products", with every partition k containing a good imported by each country in our sample.
19 
The tariff τck is interpreted as country c's tariff on the good it imports from product k, and we 
assume it is the outcome of a negotiation as previously modeled. Note that the negotiated tariff in 
equation (2) is equal to 1 (free trade) if there is full participation, no domestic political pressure 
and negligible FTA share. Taking a first-order Taylor approximation of (2) around this point, and 
















Φck +εck.  (4) 
The first challenge is to measure  , the inverse elasticity of foreign export supply of 
product k to country c, which captures country c's market power. Finding an accurate measure 
                                                 
19 Product categories are either a 6-digit HS codes or 4-digit ISIC codes, depending on the dataset. We shall use the 
terms products and sectors interchangeably to refer to these product categories. We use the term "industry" to refer 
to a higher level of aggregation than products. In the HS dataset, industries refer to HS sections. In the ISIC dataset, 
industries are defined as 3-digit ISIC codes. 
20 Note that the import demand elasticity 
€ 
µck appears in equation (4) instead of the FTA-augmented elasticity found 
in (2). This is because our approximation occurs around the point of zero FTA share, where the two elasticities are 
the same.    18 
has long been a problem in the international trade literature. Although the elasticity estimates of 
Broda,  Greenfield  and  Weinstein  (2006)  are  the  most  comprehensive  available  in  terms  of 
country and product coverage, they are very imprecise. We deal with this issue in two different 
ways. One is to follow Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) and create a categorical variable, 
“High  inverse  export  elasticity”  (HIEE),  which  is  equal  to  1  if  the  inverse  export  elasticity 
estimate is in the top two thirds of all products’ estimates within the same country and zero 
otherwise. The second approach is to use proxy measures that are both theoretically plausible 
determinants of market power and are also correlated with the inverse elasticity estimates. The 
proxies we consider are the log of GDP, which varies by country, and the Rauch classification, 
which  varies  by  product.  To  justify  using  log  of  GDP,  we  note  that  textbook  treatments  of 
optimal tariffs attribute market power to large countries and indeed, in the data (see footnote 21 
below), countries with larger GDP face lower export elasticities on average. As for the Rauch 
classification, product differentiation is normally associated with a low elasticity of substitution 
in consumption between varieties. When a country imposes a tariff, it decreases its demand for 
imported varieties and thereby drives down their world prices; however, with a low substitution 
elasticity, there is less of a tendency for consumers in other countries to substitute towards those 
varieties  and  thereby  mitigate  the  price  decline.  Thus  we  expect  that  products  classified  as 
differentiated  by  the  Rauch  classification  should  have  lower  export  elasticities  (i.e.,  higher 
importer market power) than homogenous products. This is too borne out in the data, as the 
export supply elasticity estimates are much lower for products classified as differentiated.
21 
                                                 
21 Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) investigate the correlation between inverse export elasticity and several 
market power variables, including log GDP, the Rauch index and the importing country's share of world imports by 
product, for a group of non-WTO countries. They find the same results for log GDP and the Rauch index as we do 
for WTO countries. We find a positive correlation between HIEE and the indicator of product differentiation. We 
also estimate a positive correlation between the inverse export elasticity and log GDP – controlling for product fixed 
effects – although this correlation is less robust. Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) also find that an importing   19 
The second challenge is to measure 
€ 
ΘAck, which captures how much of the terms-of-trade 
effect  of  the  tariff  is  internalized  by  the  participants  in  negotiations  over  each  product.  In 
particular,    measures  importing  country  c’s  imports  from  participants  in  GATT/WTO 
negotiations over product k as a fraction of its imports from all countries that are entitled to MFN 
treatment and are not its FTA partners. While we cannot measure the market share of participants 
directly
22, our theory tells us that it should be positively related to the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI). In our calculation of the HHI, we must account for the presence of non-GATT 
countries that receive MFN treatment and exclude each importing country’s FTA partners and 
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2 ,  (5) 
Here MFNc is the set of all countries that are granted MFN treatment by importing country c, 
excluding c's FTA partners, while GATTc is the subset of MFNc consisting of members of the 
WTO (these countries are therefore potential participants in the multilateral negotiations). We 
have data on MFN treatment only for the United States, which grants MFN treatment to all but a 
few, small, isolated countries.
23 We therefore exclude these same countries from MFNc for all 
countries in our sample. 
€ 
Mick is the value of importing country c's imports of product k from 
country i. Thus the HHI so defined equals the sum of squared shares of exports to importing 
country c by all potential (non-FTA) participants in multilateral negotiations. 
                                                                                                                                                            
country’s share of world imports is correlated with inverse export elasticity by product (although this result does not 
survive controlling for log GDP). We find no such correlation among WTO countries, thus we do not use the 
importing country’s share of world imports as a proxy of market power. 
22 There is yet no dataset on countries’ participation decisions in negotiations product by product. 
23  From  1996  onwards,  the  only  countries  that  were  not  granted  MFN  treatment  by  the  United  States  were 
Afghanistan,  Cuba,  Laos,  North  Korea,  Iran,  Vietnam,  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  Before  then,  the  US  granted 
unconditional MFN to all other countries, except Communist countries.   20 
The third challenge is to measure  , which captures the degree of domestic political 
pressure in sector k of country c. Lacking internationally comparable data on political variables, 
we take an indirect approach, as explained in detail in the following two sections. Finally, we 
also control for the FTA market share
24 – which captures the third term in (4) – and add country 
fixed effects. 
 
B. Estimation based on the 6-digit HS dataset 
We shall begin our estimation by investigating the role of country size. Ludema and 
Mayda (2009) estimate the average effect (across products) of MFN free riding on U.S. tariffs, 
ignoring cross-sector variation in market power. In this section, we conduct a similar exercise for 
all importing countries in  our  sample to  see  if  this  effect  depends  on  market size. If  larger 
countries have greater market power in general, we should expect their tariff schedules to be 
more sensitive to variation in the market share of participants and thus the HHI. To test this, we 
estimate country-specific regressions of the average MFN tariff rate (over the years 1995-2000) 
on the 1993 HHI.
25 For each of these regressions, we consider the estimated coefficient on the 
HHI  –  which  is  indeed  negative  for  most  countries  in  the  sample  –  and  plot  it  against  the 
country’s log GDP (Figure 1). We estimate the fitted regression line with weighted least squares 
(WLS) using as weights the inverse of the standard errors of the HHI coefficient estimates. The 
slope of the regression line is negative (-0.1678), which is consistent with the proposition that the 
MFN free-rider problem (as evidenced by a negative average effect of the HHI on the tariff) is 
                                                 
24 We use the definition of Article XXIV to determine FTA status. Countries that may have received preferential 
treatment  through  other  means,  such  as  the  Generalized  System  of  Preferences,  are  treated  as  MFN  non-FTA 
countries.  We  take  this  approach  mainly  because  of  the  inconsistent  coverage  and  conditional  nature  of  these 
preferences.  
25 We also control for the 1993 FTA market share and HS section dummy variables, both divided by the import 
demand elasticity. The rationale for these controls is explained below.    21 
more severe for larger countries. However, it is only significant at the 19% level (the robust 
standard error is 0.1260).  
It  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  the  country-specific  regressions  produce  weak 
findings, particularly for developing countries. The coefficients on the HHI for many developing 
countries in the sample are not statistically significant, whereas most of the OECD countries 
have  significant  coefficients  of  the  correct  sign.  These  estimates  are  consistent  with  the 
contrasting findings of Ludema and Mayda (2009) and Bagwell and Staiger (2009), as discussed 
earlier, and highlight the importance of exploiting the cross-sector heterogeneity in market power 
that is present in our data. While developing countries may have little market power on average, 
the  tariffs  in  sectors  where  they  do  have  market  power  should  exhibit  the  MFN  free-rider 
problem if our theory is correct. 
We  next  estimate  regressions  with  data  pooled  across  countries.  Incorporating  the 
considerations of Section 4.A, we derive the following specification: 
€ 










∑ Ic +εck (6) 
where 
€ 
τ95−00,ck −1  is  the  ad-valorem  MFN  tariff  rate  on  product  k  of  importing  country  c 
averaged over the years 1995-2000, 
€ 
MPck is one of our two proxies for product-specific market 
power (diff or HIEE), 
€ 
µck is importing country c’s import demand elasticity in sector k and 
€ 
ΦFTA 93,ck is importing country c’s imports from FTA partners as a share of its total imports of 
product k in 1993. 
As mentioned before, our 6-digit HS dataset lacks information on production and therefore 
on the inverse import-penetration ratio. Thus, in the HS regressions, we let the industry (HS 
section) dummies ( ) absorb the effect of both political power and inverse import-penetration   22 
ratio at the industry level. On the other hand, we can control for the product and country-specific 
import demand elasticities. Thus, we interact industry dummies and FTA shares with the inverse 
import demand elasticities (see second and third terms of equation (4)). 




H93,ck serve as proxies for the true inverse export supply elasticity 





H93,ckMPck  to  be  equal  to  1  and  -1,  respectively,  as  in  equation  (4).  Nevertheless,  the 
theoretical model pins down expected signs. We expect 
€ 
β1 to be zero or slightly negative, since 
€ 
β1 captures the effect of the HHI when 
€ 
MPck = 0, i.e. zero or low market power. On the other 
hand, the effect of the HHI on tariffs should be negative and more pronounced in sectors where 
the importing country has high market power, and thus 
€ 
β2 should be negative. In addition, we 
expect 
€ 




H93,ck = 0, which is when free riding is complete and the negotiated tariff is equal to the non-
cooperative optimal tariff. As in the optimum tariff theory, the higher importing country c’s 
market  power  in  sector  k,  the  higher  the  tariff  it  sets.  The  coefficient  on  the  FTA  share  is 
theoretically ambiguous. A negative coefficient would indicate that the importing country does 
not fully internalize the effect of its tariff on its FTA partners (i.e., 
€ 
φ <1), while the opposite 
interpretation is true for a positive coefficient.  
Table 1 shows the results of estimating equation (6). Note that standard errors reported in 
these and all the following regressions in the paper are robust – to address heteroskedasticity – 
and clustered by country – to account for correlation of observations within a country. The first 
column contains OLS estimates and uses the Rauch proxy for market power. Specifically, the 
categorical variable diff is equal to 1 if the product is differentiated and zero otherwise. The 
second  column  uses  HIEE  as  the  measure  of  market  power.  The  OLS  results  for  the  two   23 
specifications (regressions (1)-(2)) show that 
€ 
β2 is negative and significant. Thus, a country’s 
MFN tariff is decreasing in the HHI for products over which it has high market power. The direct 
effect of market power 
€ 
β3 is positive and significant, while the direct effect of HHI (
€ 
β1) is 
positive and insignificant. All these results are exactly consistent with our expectations. Finally, 
the effect of the FTA share variable is insignificant, which provides evidence for neither of the 
interpretations above. 
Columns (3) and (4) address the issue of potential endogeneity of the HHI using an IV 
approach. It is possible that other domestic political-economy determinants of a country's MFN 
tariff rates, not captured in the theoretical model, are correlated with the HHI. We construct an 
instrument for the HHI for each country c by finding the three countries in our sample with HHI 
most highly correlated with that of c and using the average of their HHI as an instrument for c’s 
HHI.
26 The reason for averaging is to avoid data loss resulting from cross-country variation in the 
number of observations.
27 We do not instrument for the market power variables, as we regard the 
elasticity estimates and product classification to be exogenous. The results in columns (3) and (4) 
are qualitatively the same as in the OLS regressions, although the interaction coefficient 
€ 
β2 is 
larger  in  absolute  value  and  the  direct  effect  of  the  HHI  (
€ 
β1)  is  now  negative  (and  weakly 
significant when HIEE is used as the measure of market power). Finally, the direct effect of 
market power on the tariff 
€ 
β3 is still positive and significant at the one percent level in both 
specifications. We take these results to be strong evidence of a free rider problem of the MFN 
clause driven by the terms-of-trade effect. 
                                                 
26 As far as the first stage is concerned, the correlation coefficient between the instrument and the HHI is 0.50 
(significant at the 1% level) in the 6-digit HS data set and 0.48 (significant at the 1% level) in the 4-digit ISIC data 
set. As for the exclusion restriction, it is unlikely a country's political-economy dynamics are influenced by other 
countries' HHI.  
27 To see this, consider the following example: the EU has 4691 observations for the HHI, while the country whose 
HHI is most correlated with that of the EU is Norway, with 3572 observations. If we use Norway’s HHI alone as an 
instrument for the EU’s HHI, we lose a quarter of our EU data.    24 
Based  on  the  coefficient  estimates  in  regression  (3),  which  measures  market  power 
according  to  the  Rauch  classification,  we  find  that  a  10  percentage  points  increase  in  the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index reduces the importing country's MFN tariff rate by 0.8 percentage 
points (this change is not small given that the mean of the dependent variable in that regression is 
13 percentage points). Remarkably, based on regression (4), we get exactly the same magnitude 
of the effect of an increase in the HHI by 10 percentage points – i.e., a reduction of the MFN 
tariff rate by 0.8 percentage points – when the sector is characterized by high inverse export 
elasticity.  
Another way to gauge the magnitude of our results is to consider the counterfactual of 
setting the HHI equal to zero. This produces an estimate of what the tariff would be in the 
absence of negotiations, because a zero HHI corresponds to such extreme free riding that none of 
the  terms  of  trade  effects  of  a  country's  tariff  reduction  would  be  internalized  among  the 
participants.  For  each  6-digit  product,  we  compare  the  predicted  cooperative  tariff 
(corresponding to the actual HHI) with the predicted non-cooperative tariff (corresponding to 
HHI = 0). Next we take the average of these differences across products and countries. Based on 
this measure, using the HIEE measure of market power, we estimate that the internalization of 
terms of trade effects through WTO negotiations has lowered tariffs by about 22% compared to 
the non-cooperative level. It is 19% using the Rauch measure. Figure 2 breaks this down by HS 
section.  While the two measures of market power give different results, they agree on the main 
points: food, textiles and clothing are predicted to experience the smallest tariff reductions, while 
machines, transport equipment and instruments are predicted to experience the largest. This is 
driven by the combination of HHI and market power differences across sections.    25 
Note that these effects may be a lower bound of the true effects. For example, it could be 
that  a  market  with  few  foreign  suppliers  (and  thus  high  HHI)  is  also  less  competitive 
domestically, i.e. the HHI of export shares is likely to be positively correlated with domestic 
(firm) concentration. In that case, the tariff might reflect rent shifting motives (i.e., strategic trade 
policy  considerations)  or  a  disproportionate  political  influence  from  concentrated  domestic 
producers.  Alternatively,  it  could  be  that  a  high  tariff  itself  weeds  out  the  smaller  foreign 
suppliers and increases the HHI directly.
28 Although both of these stories should be addressed by 
our IV strategy, they would in any event suggest a positive correlation between the HHI and the 
tariff, which may cloak the full negative effect of the HHI. 
Table 2 tests the robustness of our findings. Here we add, as controls, the share of each 
importing country's total exports (i.e., of all products) to the top five exporters of each product to 
that  country  (share  of  IC's  exports  to  top  5  exporters)  and  non-GATT  market  share.  In 
considering the impact of these two controls, we account for cross-product variation in monopoly 
power by interacting them with the market power variables. The reason for the first control is 
reciprocity.  Our  theory  assumes  that  exporting  countries  reciprocate  with  transfers,  while  in 
practice countries exchange trade barrier concessions of various kinds.  In such a world, it could 
be that importing country c is more inclined to swap concessions with countries that represent a 
large market for its exports. One might be concerned that the products principally supplied by 
such countries have high HHI, thus causing a negative correlation between the HHI and the MFN 
tariff rate unrelated to MFN. The share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters thus represents a 
                                                 
28 If, as discussed in footnote 3, all non-FTA exporters have the same export supply elasticity, then the HHI would 
be invariant to the tariff. Otherwise, the tariff can affect the HHI but in a generally ambiguous way. If an increase in 
the tariff causes larger (smaller) exporters to gain market share, then the HHI would increase (decrease).   26 
measure of importing country c’s overall export dependence on the principal suppliers of each 
product it imports.
29   
The  logic  behind  non-GATT  market  share  is  that  we  include  non-GATT  countries 
receiving MFN treatment (e.g., China) in the denominator of the HHI but exclude them from the 
numerator, because they are not potential participants in the negotiations. Therefore, the higher 
the non-GATT market share, the lower our measure of the HHI. Therefore, by controlling for the 
non-GATT market share, we can check whether the negative impact of the HHI is mostly driven 
by countries that cannot participate in negotiations (because they are not GATT-WTO members) 
as opposed to being driven by countries that decide not to (although they are members of the 
GATT-WTO system). Our results on the two additional control variables are for the most part 
insignificant; however, and most importantly, none of our main findings changes. Thus, our 
findings  are  driven  entirely  by  the  sectoral  variation  in  concentration  among  GATT-WTO 
members.   
Table 3 adds industry (HS section) fixed effects in addition to the HS section dummy 
variables  interacted  with  the  inverse  import  demand  elasticities  present  in  the  previous 
regressions. In our model, industry effects enter only through the domestic political economy 
term,  which  is  why  we  have  only  considered  industry  dummies  interacted  with  the  inverse 
import demand elasticities to this point. More generally, however, there may be industry-level 
effects  that  lie  outside  of  our  model,  such  as  alternative  domestic  political  determinants  or 
possibly foreign political pressure. The results based on adding the industry fixed effects are very 
similar to our previous findings. 
                                                 
29 Bown (2004) uses essentially the same measure. He finds that the greater a country’s export dependence on the 
principal suppliers of a given product, as measured by the share of its worldwide exports (of all products) sold to 
those  suppliers,  the  less  likely  it  is  to  implement  protection  (safeguards  and  safeguard-like  measures)  on  that 
product.   27 
 
C. Estimation based on the 4-digit ISIC dataset 
Recall that the main advantage of the 4-digit ISIC dataset is that it contains information 
on production levels by sector, which enables us to control explicitly for the inverse import 
penetration  ratio  and  thus  capture  a  key  domestic  political  economy  determinant  of  the 
negotiated tariff in our theory. Using this data set, we follow the same steps as in the previous 
section. 
We first investigate the role of country size. We estimate country-specific regressions of 
the  average  MFN  tariff  rate  (over  the  years  1995-1999)  on  the  1993  HHI.
30  The  estimated 
coefficient on the HHI is indeed negative for most countries in the sample. It is plotted against 
the country’s log GDP in Figure 3. The slope of the fitted line – estimated using WLS – is 
negative (-0.7443), but unlike before it is highly significant (at the 1% level, with robust standard 
error of 0.2384). The reason for this difference may be the country sample, which contains fewer 
very small countries or poor countries. Nonetheless, the regression confirms that the negative 
impact of the HHI on the MFN tariff rate – driven by the free riding effect of the MFN clause – 
is more pronounced for larger countries. 
We next estimate the model pooling the data across countries. The specification we use 
resembles equation (6): 
€ 
τ95−99,ck −1=α + β1H93,ck + β2H93,ckMPck + β3MPck + ηlIl
X93,ck
M93,ck l
∑ + β4ΦFTA 93,ck + γcIc
c
∑ +εck  (7) 
where 
€ 
τ95−99,ck −1  is  the  ad-valorem  MFN  tariff  rate  on  product  k  of  importing  country  c 
averaged over the years 1995-1999, 
€ 
MPck is one of our two proxies for product-specific market 
                                                 
30 We also control for the 1993 FTA market share and the interaction of industry dummy variables with the inverse 
import penetration ratio to control for political economy factors. We justify this approach below.    28 
power (diffshare or HIEE), 
€ 
X93,ck M93,ck  is the inverse import-penetration ratio in 1993 (ratio of 
domestic  total  output  to  imports)  and 
€ 
ΦFTA 93,ck  is  importing  country  c’s  imports  from  FTA 
partners as a share of total imports of product k in 1993. Equation (7) differs from equation (6) in 
a few respects. First, we control explicitly for the inverse import penetration ratio. However, we 
are unable to include import demand elasticities in the ISIC analysis without an unacceptable 
drop in sample size. Thus, the industry dummy variables ( ) in the political-economy term 
capture the impact of each industry's political power and import demand elasticity, which are 
assumed to be constant across all sectors within an industry and the same across importing 
countries.
31 In addition, the FTA share variable is not divided by the import demand elasticity. 
Therefore  the  coefficients  on  the  political  economy  and  FTA  terms  are  not  comparable  in 
magnitude across the HS vs. ISIC regressions. The last difference between the two specifications 
is that the Rauch proxy for market power used in the ISIC regressions is diffshare, i.e. the share 
of the 4-digit SITC products – within each 4-digit ISIC category – classified as differentiated. 
Tables 4 through 6 present the estimates using the 4-digit ISIC dataset. These results are 
qualitatively very similar to the 6-digit HS findings. Regressions (1)-(2) in Table 4 agree on the 
main point: 
€ 
β2 is negative and significant. Thus, a country’s MFN tariff is decreasing in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for products over which it has high market power. The direct effect 
of  market  power 
€ 
β3  is  positive,  which  is  consistent  with  our  expectations;  however,  it  is 
significant only in the first specification. Contrary to expectations, the direct effect of HHI is also 
positive and marginally significant in the first regression, but this is not robust to the measure of 
                                                 
31 To relax the assumption that each industry’s political power and import demand elasticity are the same across 
importing countries, we also consider – in additional regressions – country-specific industry dummy variables.   29 
market power. The effect of FTA share is now strongly negative.
32 The interpretation of this 
result is that importing countries do not fully internalize the effect of their tariffs on their FTA 
partners (i.e.,  ). In particular, the higher the FTA share, the smaller the terms-of-trade gain 
for an importing country from setting a high tariff (as the price of products coming from FTA 
partners equals the domestic price), and therefore the lower the MFN tariff. 
The IV regressions (columns (3) and (4)) in Table 4 give a similar picture.
33 The only 
difference relative to the OLS estimates is that the positive direct effect of market power is now 
larger and more significant. Tables 5 and 6 present the estimates for the 4-digit ISIC data adding 
controls and industry fixed effects, respectively. There are few differences between these results 
and those of the previous tables. Finally, in additional regressions (not shown), we estimate a 
modified version of equation (7) where we replace the industry dummy variables with importing-
country-specific industry dummy variables. We find very similar results. 
To conclude, we believe we found remarkably robust evidence of a free rider problem of 
the MFN clause driven by the terms-of-trade effect. Our results are even stronger in light of the 
following  consideration.  Participants  in  the  negotiations  may  try  to  constrain  the  MFN 
externality via reciprocity and their determination to do so might be greater when MFN free-rider 
issues are more severe (i.e., the HHI is low). This would imply that when the HHI is low (and 
our model predicts that the tariff should be high, assuming high market power), endogenous 
mitigation of the MFN externality should reduce the incentive for free riding, thereby lowering 
the tariff relative to our prediction. In other words, the presence of this effect should bias the 
coefficient on the interaction 
€ 
H93,ckMPck towards zero. The fact that we find a negative and 
                                                 
32 Note that, while FTA share could be endogenous due to reverse causality, this is likely to create a positive bias in 
the estimate of the coefficient, as higher MFN tariff rates should increase import shares from FTA partner countries. 
33 Note that the instrument for the HHI is slightly different from the one used in the 6-digit HS regressions. For each 
country c, we find the other country in our sample with HHI most highly correlated with that of c and use its HHI as 
an instrument for c’s HHI.   30 
significant coefficient tells us that, whatever the importance of this effect, the MFN free rider 




The main findings of this paper are twofold. First, the MFN tariffs of WTO countries are 
higher in the presence of market power, controlling for factors affecting domestic politics and 
international negotiations. This result generalizes to WTO countries the evidence on optimal 
tariffs found by Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) who use a sample of non-WTO countries. 
Second,  and  arguably  more  important,  we  find  a  country’s  MFN  tariff  is  decreasing  in  the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for products over which it has high market power. This generalizes 
the evidence on the MFN free rider problem found by Ludema and Mayda (2009) using U.S. 
data and provides clear evidence that the free rider problem is driven by terms-of-trade effects, as 
suggested by the theory. Moreover, by establishing that MFN free riding occurs and operates 
through the terms of trade, we generalize to WTO countries the findings of Bagwell and Staiger 
(2009)  for  accession  countries  that  indeed  trade  agreements  are  affected  by  terms-of-trade 
considerations.  
The broader implications of these findings are also threefold. First, if terms of trade drive 
trade agreements, then the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination on which so much of 
the WTO seemingly depends are indeed valuable, and the attempts of economists and legal 
scholars to understand the WTO in these terms should prove fruitful. Second, if the MFN free 
                                                 
34 Another exercise we carry out to test the robustness of our results – in particular, the fact that the effect of the HHI 
on MFN tariff rates is indeed driven by the MFN clause – focuses on the US (for data availability reasons). In 
particular, we estimate the effect of our covariates on US tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The logic is that 
tariffs and NTBs share many common determinants but not the MFN free rider problem. Thus, if the HHI negatively 
affects NTBs, as it does tariffs, it would call into question whether the HHI is really capturing the MFN free rider 
effect. We find no significant correlation between the HHI and NTBs in the US case (Ludema and Mayda 2009).     31 
rider problem exists and is widespread, as we have shown, then it suggests that the principle of 
nondiscrimination is not without its drawbacks. There are many benefits to MFN discussed in the 
literature, so it would be premature to advocate the elimination of MFN based on our results. The 
solution to the MFN free rider problem is to provide greater inducements for participation and/or 
isolate free riders from the benefits of liberalization. The principal supplier rule, reciprocity, the 
use of formula negotiations and the single undertaking can all be seen as attempts to combat the 
MFN free rider problem along one or both of these dimensions.  At this point, all we know is that 
they haven’t eliminated the problem.  More study is required to determine what effects these 
approaches have had and to suggest preferable alternatives. 
Finally, developing countries have long complained that the WTO has produced too little 
trade liberalization on products they predominantly export. Indeed, addressing this imbalance 
was one of the top priorities of the Doha Development Round.  This paper sheds some light on 
this controversy. In particular, our estimates show that food, textiles and clothing experience the 
smallest tariff reductions, while machines, transport equipment and instruments experience the 
largest.  This  is  driven  by  the  combination  of  HHI  and  market  power  differences  across 
industries. Thus, the root of the problem (and hopefully the clue to its solution) may not be the 
callous  indifference  of  developed  countries  to  the  concerns  of  the  poor  or  even  a  lack  of 
developing-country  bargaining  power  but  the  MFN  free  rider  problem,  which  is  part  of  the 
underlying structure of the WTO itself.   
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Journal of Political Economy 32(1), 101-129. Figure 1: The coefficient estimate on the HHI as a function of GDP of the importing country (HS6)
Data source: 6-digit HS data set. The slope of the line is -0.1678, significant at the 19% level (robust standard error of 0.1260).
The regression line is estimated with weighted least squares (WLS) using as weights the inverse of the standard errors of the
coefficient estimates (on the HHI) from the first stage. WLS puts more weight on countries with smaller variance of the estimated
coefficients. Three outliers are dropped from the graph: Iceland, Gabon, Mauritius.1 2 3 4
Method OLS  OLS  IV IV
Dependent variable
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993) 0.35 0.35 -1.72 -2.92
0.57 0.65 1.75 1.54+




Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993)*High Inverse Export Elasticity -1.7 -5.06
0.53** 1.69**
High Inverse Export Elasticity 2 3.72
0.57** 1.28**
FTA share (1993)/import demand elasticity 1.95 2.15 2.22 2.4
1.47 1.53 1.45 1.52
Constant 12.5 12.95 13.8 15.04
0.64** 0.73** 1.22** 1.18**
HS section dummy variables/import demand elasticity  yes yes yes yes
Observations 120483 120668 118303 118303
R-squared 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37
Average MFN tariff rate (1995-2000)
Source: WITS plus additional data sources (see text). Robust standard errors, clustered by importing country, under each estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at
5%; ** significant at 1%. Importing country fixed effects are included in each regression. For each sector, the Herfindhal-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares
from each exporting country to each importing country. The Herfindhal-Hirschman index is calculated excluding countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the
importing country and excluding countries without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong to the WTO but receive MFN treatment by the importing country are included
in the denominator of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, but not in the numerator.
Table 1: Free-riding and MFN tariff rates across countries (6-digit HS data)
Diff is an indicator of goods which are classified as differentiated according to Rauch. The High Inverse Export Elasticity is equal to 1 if the inverse export elasticity of the product
is above the 33rd percentile of elasticities of that country. The FTA Share gives the overall import share (by sector) from countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement
with the importing country. EC countries are considered as one block. In regressions (3)-(4), we instrument the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: For each country c, we find the three
other countries in our sample with Herfindahl-Hirschman index most highly correlated with that of c and use the average of their Herfindahl-Hirschman indices as an instrument





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Percentage difference between the cooperative and non-
cooperative tariff 
Diff 
HIEE 1 2 3 4
Method OLS  OLS  IV IV
Dependent variable
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993) 0.41 0.43 -2.73 -3.41
0.56 0.66 2.3 1.74+




Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993)*High Inverse Export Elasticity -1.63 -4.92
0.58** 1.81*
High Inverse Export Elasticity 2.9 4.57
0.96** 1.66**
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 0.55 2.39 -1.48 0.21
1.38 1.35+ 1.49 1.44
non-GATT market share (1993) 0.25 0.11 -1.11 -0.18
0.28 0.1 1.28 0.25
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993)*diff -0.41 -0.06
1.89 2.08
non-GATT market share (1993)*diff -0.09 1.05
0.26 1.23
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993)*HIEE -2.42 -2.38
1.9 2.01
non-GATT market share (1993)*HIEE 0.08 0.08
0.08 0.14
FTA share (1993)/import demand elasticity 1.28 1.22 2.42 2.44
1.43 1.53 1.46 1.55
Constant 12.21 11.98 14.79 15.01
0.96** 0.96** 1.92** 1.52**
HS section dummy variables/import demand elasticity yes yes yes yes
Observations 114204 114389 112319 112319
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38
Source: WITS plus additional data sources (see text). Robust standard errors, clustered by importing country, under each estimated coefficient. +
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Importing country fixed effects are included in each regression. For each sector, the
Herfindhal-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares from each exporting country to each importing country. The Herfindhal-
Hirschman index is calculated excluding countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country and excluding countries
without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong to the WTO but receive MFN treatment by the importing country are included in the
denominator of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, but not in the numerator. See the definition of the additional variables and of the instrument for the
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (regressions (3)-(4)) at the end of Table 1.
Table 2: Free-riding and MFN tariff rates across countries controlling for additional determinants (6-digit HS data)
Average MFN tariff rate (1995-2000)1 2 3 4
Method OLS  OLS  IV IV
Dependent variable
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993) 0.13 0 -2.07 -3.48
0.53 0.63 1.78 1.56*




Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993)*High Inverse Export Elasticity -1.31 -4.11
0.54* 1.76*
High Inverse Export Elasticity 1.69 3.15
0.51** 1.19*
FTA share (1993)/import demand elasticity 2.3 2.98 2.44 3.04
1.42 1.57+ 1.39+ 1.55+
Constant 17.9 18.16 19.1 20.41
2.38** 2.35** 2.98** 2.69**
HS section dummy variables/import demand elasticity  yes yes yes yes
Observations 120483 120668 118303 118303
R-squared 0.4 0.4 0.39 0.39
Average MFN tariff rate (1995-2000)
Source: WITS plus additional data sources (see text). Robust standard errors, clustered by importing country, under each estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant
at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Importing country fixed effects are included in each regression. Each regression also controls for HS section dummy variables. For each sector, the
Herfindhal-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares from each exporting country to each importing country. The Herfindhal-Hirschman index is calculated
excluding countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country and excluding countries without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong
to the WTO but receive MFN treatment by the importing country are included in the denominator of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, but not in the numerator.
Table 3: Free-riding and MFN tariff rates across countries (6-digit HS data)
Diff is an indicator of goods which are classified as differentiated according to Rauch. The High Inverse Export Elasticity is equal to 1 if the inverse export elasticity of the
product is above the 33rd percentile of elasticities of that country. The FTA Share gives the overall import share (by sector) from countries which are part of a preferential trade
agreement with the importing country. EC countries are considered as one block. In regressions (3)-(4), we instrument the Herfindhal-Hirschman index: For each country c, we
find the three other countries in our sample with Herfindahl index most highly correlated with that of c and use the average of their Herfindahl indices as an instrument for c’s
Herfindahl index.
(controlling for section dummy variables)Figure 3: The coefficient estimate on the HHI as a function of GDP of the importing country (ISIC)
Data source: 4-digit ISIC (Rev.2) data set. The slope of the line is -0.7443, significant at the 1% level (robust standard error of 0.2384).
The regression line is estimated with weighted least squares (WLS) using as weights the inverse of the standard errors of the
coefficient estimates (on the HHI) from the first stage. WLS puts more weight on countries with smaller variance of the estimated
coefficients.1 2 3 4
Method OLS  OLS  IV IV
Dependent variable
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993) 3.75 1.5 9.07 1.85
2.07+ 1.8 3.90* 3.43




Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993)*High Inverse Export Elasticity -4.43 -11.32
1.94* 2.83**
High Inverse Export Elasticity 0.62 2.57
0.61 0.88**
FTA share (1993) -4.37 -4.94 -3.92 -5.19
1.15** 1.44** 0.89** 0.93**
Constant 8.79 9.7 7.05 9.57
0.63** 0.49** 1.23** 1.09**
inverse import penetration ratio (1993)*industry DVs yes yes yes yes
Observations 2417 1932 2417 1932
R-squared 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54
Average MFN tariff rate (1995-1999)
Source: World Bank's Trade & Production Database plus additional data sources (see text). Robust standard errors, clustered by importing country, under each estimated
coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Importing country fixed effects are included in each regression. Outliers (MFN tariff rates higher than
50) are excluded. MFN tariff rates (in percentage points) are simple averages at the 4 digit level ISIC. Industries are defined as 3-digit ISIC codes. For each sector, the
Herfindhal-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares from each exporting country to each importing country. The Herfindhal-Hirschman index is calculated
excluding countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country and excluding countries without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong
to the WTO but receive MFN treatment by the importing country are included in the denominator of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, but not in the numerator.
Table 4: Free-riding and MFN tariff rates across countries (ISIC Rev.2 data)
The diffshare is the share of 5-digit US SIC products in each 4-digit ISIC category that are classified as differentiated according to Rauch. The High Inverse Export Elasticity is 
equal to 1 if the inverse export elasticity of the product is above the 33rd percentile of elasticities of that country. The inverse import penetration ratio equals the ratio of output
value to imports in each sector. The FTA Share gives the overall import share (by sector) from countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing
country. EC countries are considered as one block. In regressions (3)-(4), we instrument the Herfindhal-Hirschman index: For each country c, we find the other country in our
sample with Herfindahl index most highly correlated with that of c, and we use that value as an instrument for c’s Herfindahl index.  1 2 3 4
Method OLS  OLS  IV IV
Dependent variable
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993) 4.9 2.52 10.86 2.54
2.11* 2.13 4.62* 4.76




Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993)*High Inverse Export Elasticity -2.6 -11.46
2.21 3.35**
High Inverse Export Elasticity -0.59 2.57
0.85 1.07*
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) -4.86 -8.74 -7.03 -7.78
7.38 14.1 8.14 15.8
non-GATT market share (1993) 2.87 1.94 7.13 1.8
2.67 2.53 4.8 3.54
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993)*diffshare 24.64 26.63
15.13 16.52
non-GATT market share (1993)*diffshare 4 -4.52
3.48 5.69
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993)*HIEE 21.13 21.64
16.1 18.03
non-GATT market share (1993)*HIEE 4.27 -1.13
3.56 3.07
FTA share (1993) -2.55 -3.25 -2.98 -4.87
1.6 1.88+ 1.51+ 1.50**
Constant 8.6 9.51 6.24 9.28
0.66** 0.71** 1.64** 1.54**
inverse import penetration ratio (1993)*industry DVs yes yes yes yes
Observations 2417 1932 2417 1932
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.54
Source: World Bank's Trade & Production Database plus additional data sources (see text). Robust standard errors, clustered by importing country,
under each estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Importing country fixed effects are included in each
regression. Outliers (MFN tariff rates higher than 50) are excluded. MFN tariff rates (in percentage points) are simple averages at the 4 digit level
ISIC. Industries are defined as 3-digit ISIC codes. EC countries are considered as one block. See the definition of the additional variables and of the
instrument for the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (regressions (3)-(4)) at the end of Table 4.
Table 5: Free-riding and MFN tariff rates across countries controlling for additional determinants (ISIC Rev.2 data)
Average MFN tariff rate (1995-1999)1 2 3 4
Method OLS  OLS  IV IV
Dependent variable
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993) 1.11 0.82 4.29 1.19
2.04 1.85 4.35 4.41




Herfindhal-Hirschman index (1993)*High Inverse Export Elasticity -2.05 -6.98
2.04 3.17*
High Inverse Export Elasticity 1.57 2.98
0.66* 1.00**
FTA share (1993) -2.42 -2.9 -2.23 -3.12
0.57** 0.90** 0.52** 0.76**
Constant 12.42 12.79 11.44 12.72
0.89** 1.01** 1.40** 1.53**
inverse import penetration ratio (1993)*industry DVs yes yes yes yes
Observations 2417 1932 2417 1932
R-squared 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.67
The Market Share is the importing country’s share in world imports of a particular good. The diffshare is the share of 5-digit US SIC products in each 4-digit ISIC category that are
classified as differentiated according to Rauch. The High Inverse Export Elasticity is equal to 1 if the inverse export elasticity of the product is above the 33rd percentile of elasticities of
that country. The inverse import penetration ratio equals the ratio of output value to imports in each sector. The FTA Share gives the overall import share (by sector) from countries which
are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country. EC countries are considered as one block. In regressions (3)-(4), we instrument the Herfindhal-Hirschman index: For
each country c, we find the other country in our sample with Herfindahl index most highly correlated with that of c, and we use that value as an instrument for c’s Herfindahl index.  
Average MFN tariff rate (1995-1999)
Source: World Bank's Trade & Production Database plus additional data sources (see text). Robust standard errors, clustered by importing country, under each estimated coefficient. +
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Importing country fixed effects are included in each regression. Each regression also controls for industry dummy variables.
Outliers (MFN tariff rates higher than 50) are excluded. MFN tariff rates (in percentage points) are simple averages at the 4 digit level ISIC. Industries are defined as 3-digit ISIC codes. For 
each sector, the Herfindhal-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares from each exporting country to each importing country. The Herfindhal-Hirschman index is
calculated excluding countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country and excluding countries without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong
to the WTO but receive MFN treatment by the importing country are included in the denominator of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, but not in the numerator.
Table 6: Free-riding and MFN tariff rates across countries  (ISIC Rev.2 data)
(controlling for industry dummy variables)GDP in 1993 Variable N mean sd min max
MFN tariff rate (1995-2000) 25159 13.9373 13.6775 0.0000 154.1600
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 27436 0.7039 0.2807 0.0000 1.0000
FTA Share (1993) 27436 0.1047 0.2456 0.0000 0.9996
import demand elasticity 27436 9.1049 25.2820 1.1025 759.9526
diff 27436 0.6947 0.4605 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 27436 0.6935 0.4611 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 27436 0.3674 0.2073 0.0000 0.9313
non-GATT market share (1993) 24423 0.1282 1.7239 0.0000 118.8776
MFN tariff rate (1995-2000) 36468 14.3064 13.5755 0.0000 416.0833
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 36687 0.5997 0.3184 0.0000 1.0000
FTA Share (1993) 36687 0.1483 0.3123 0.0000 0.9999
import demand elasticity 36687 9.2268 91.2461 1.1576 16808.0400
diff 36687 0.6239 0.4844 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 36687 0.6947 0.4605 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 32818 0.3352 0.1777 0.0000 0.7594
non-GATT market share (1993) 36687 0.0999 0.2095 0.0000 0.9999
MFN tariff rate (1995-2000) 29728 11.7447 13.4192 0.0000 644.8800
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 29796 0.4784 0.2789 0.0000 1.0000
FTA Share (1993) 29796 0.0283 0.1235 0.0000 0.9996
import demand elasticity 29796 4.5569 8.0214 1.1530 131.5013
diff 29611 0.5912 0.4916 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 29796 0.6566 0.4749 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 29796 0.3185 0.1599 0.0000 0.6391
non-GATT market share (1993) 29796 0.1084 0.2040 0.0000 0.9998
MFN tariff rate (1995-2000) 29313 10.8112 12.4335 0.0000 299.5900
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 29545 0.5209 0.2973 0.0000 1.0000
FTA Share (1993) 29545 0.1800 0.2965 0.0000 1.0000
import demand elasticity 29545 5.4088 11.1955 1.0743 195.9547
diff 29545 0.5859 0.4926 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 29545 0.6816 0.4659 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 29545 0.4004 0.3000 0.0000 0.9059
non-GATT market share (1993) 29545 0.1161 0.2956 0.0000 25.6835
greater than 75th 
percentile
Source: WITS plus additional data sources (see text). For each sector, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares
from each exporting country to each importing country. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is calculated excluding countries which are part of a
preferential trade agreement with the importing country and excluding countries without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong to the
WTO but receive MFN treatment by the importing country are included in the denominator of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, but not in the
numerator. Diff is an indicator of goods which are classified as differentiated according to Rauch. The High Inverse Export Elasticity is equal to
1 if the inverse export elasticity of the product is above the 33rd percentile of elasticities of that country. The FTA Share gives the overall import
share (by sector) from countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country.
Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics of variables by GDP  (6-digit HS data)
smaller than 25th 
percentile
between 25th and 
50th percentile
between 50th and 
75th percentileGDP in 1993 Variable N mean sd min max
MFN tariff rate (1995-1999) 567 10.5416 5.8584 0.0000 37.1632
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 567 0.3221 0.1744 0.0000 1.0000
FTA Share (1993) 567 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Inverse Import Penetration Ratio (1993) 566 31.6449 266.1269 0.0000 4478.4400
diffshare 567 0.6901 0.4079 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 391 0.7059 0.4562 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 567 0.0078 0.0238 0.0000 0.2806
non-GATT market share (1993) 566 0.0890 0.1341 0.0000 0.9094
MFN tariff rate (1995-1999) 636 14.7060 9.4812 0.0000 39.1100
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 636 0.2534 0.2368 0.0000 1.0000
FTA Share (1993) 636 0.1698 0.3169 0.0000 0.9951
Inverse Import Penetration Ratio (1993) 635 136.1782 1999.0600 0.0000 48437.6300
diffshare 636 0.6990 0.4035 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 542 0.7380 0.4401 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 636 0.0061 0.0290 0.0000 0.4460
non-GATT market share (1993) 635 0.1031 0.1432 0.0000 0.9607
MFN tariff rate (1995-1999) 586 16.0416 12.3428 0.0000 49.8450
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 586 0.3071 0.2024 0.0022 1.0000
FTA Share (1993) 586 0.0099 0.0489 0.0000 0.8494
Inverse Import Penetration Ratio (1993) 584 91.7362 1143.9070 0.0000 26992.7800
diffshare 586 0.6944 0.4058 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 376 0.7261 0.4466 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 586 0.0069 0.0196 0.0000 0.2065
non-GATT market share (1993) 586 0.1233 0.1451 0.0000 0.9309
MFN tariff rate (1995-1999) 634 11.8860 11.0020 0.0000 48.6937
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 634 0.2870 0.2066 0.0000 0.9794
FTA Share (1993) 634 0.1164 0.2271 0.0000 0.9834
Inverse Import Penetration Ratio (1993) 632 86.3822 1119.4340 0.0000 26971.6300
diffshare 634 0.7016 0.4016 0.0000 1.0000
High Inverse Export Elasticity 625 0.7328 0.4429 0.0000 1.0000
share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 634 0.0070 0.0187 0.0000 0.1949
non-GATT market share (1993) 633 0.1367 0.1616 0.0000 0.9704
The share of IC's exports to top 5 exporters (1993) gives the fraction of total exports of each importing country going to the five principal
suppliers of each product. The non-GATT market share (1993) is exports to each importing country by countries which are granted MFN
treatment by that importing country but are not GATT/WTO members, as a fraction of total imports of that importing country from non-FTA
countries which receive MFN treatment. 
The Herfindhal-Hirschman index is calculated excluding countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country
and excluding countries without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong to the WTO but receive MFN treatment by the importing
country are included in the denominator of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, but not in the numerator. The FTA Share gives the overall import
share (by sector) from countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the importing country. The inverse import penetration
ratio equals the ratio of output value to imports in each sector. The Market Share is the importing country’s share in world imports of a
particular good. The diffshare is the share of 5-digit US SIC products in each 4-digit ISIC category that are classified as differentiated
according to Rauch. The High Inverse Export Elasticity is equal to 1 if the inverse export elasticity of the product is above the 33rd percentile
of elasticities of that country.
Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics of variables by GDP (ISIC Rev.2 data)
Outliers (MFN tariff rates higher than 50) are excluded. MFN tariff rates (in percentage points) are simple averages at the 4 digit level ISIC.
For each sector, the Herfindhal-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares from each exporting country to a given importing
country.
smaller than 25th 
percentile
between 25th and 
50th percentile
between 50th and 
75th percentile
greater than 75th 
percentile